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MENTAL ILLNESS AS AN EXCUSE FOR CIVIL WRONGS 
George J. Alexander* and Thomas S. Szasz** 
1. Introduction 
Mental illness is one of the traditional excusing conditions for crime. Since 
Daniel M'Naghten's historical acquittal by reason of insanity in 1843/ the 
issue of nonresponsibility for crime because of mental illness has occupied the 
attention of legislators, judges, attorneys and psychiatrists, and has resulted in 
a massive body of judicial decisions and scholarly analyses.2 In contrast, the 
subject of nonresponsibility for civil wrongs because of mental illnes has received 
scant attention.3 In this article we intend to bring the discussion of the relation 
between mental illness and tort up to date. 
II. The Concept of Mental Illness 
In both civil and criminal cases the concepts of "mental illnes," "insanity," 
and "psychosis" constitute an important part of the legal definitions in issue 
and thus strongly influence the ultimate determination of responsibility. Yet; 
the precise behavioral content or operational meaning of these terms is neither 
clear nor generally agreed upon.4 We shall begin therefore with a brief survey 
of the customary uses of the concept of mental illnes. 
First, mental illness is not the name of a physical incapacity. The crucial 
manifestations of mental illness are behavioral, not physical. Second, mental 
illness may be attributed to a physical disease or injury. A person with neuro­
syphilis may be said to be "insane" or to have an "organic psychosis," or a 
drunk person to suffer from a "toxic psychosis."5 In such cases, mental illnes 
is attributed to anatomical or chemical alterations in the brain. Third, mental 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Syracuse University College of Law. 
** Professor of Psychiatry, State University of New York, Upstate Medical Center. The 
authors wish to thank John T. Owens for his research assistance in preparing this article. 
1 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). 
2 For a small sampling, see: Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, 70 
YALE L.J. 225 (1960); Guttmacher, Implications of the Durham Case Decision, 3 J. FOR. 
SCI. 135 (1958); Insanity and the Criminal Law--A Symposium, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 
(1955); Montrose, The McNaghten Rules, 18 Modern L. Rev. 505 (1955); Mueller, 
M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable, 50 GEO. L.J. 105 (1961); Rome, McNaughton, Durham 
and Psychiatry, 34 F.R.D. 93 (1964); Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 
793 (1955); Criminal Responsibility and Mental Disease, 26 TENN. L. REV. 221 (1959). 
One of the authors has published his views on the subject in: T. SZASZ, LAw, LmERTY, AND 
PSYCHIATRY (1963). 
3 See Ague, The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 DICK. L. REV. 211 
(1956); Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1924); 
Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 333 (1921); Curran, Tort 
Liability of the Mentally II and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52 (1960); Green, 
Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1189 (1940); 
Hornblower, Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 278 (1905); Weisiger, 
Tort Liability of Minors and Incompetents, U. ILL. L.F. 227 (1951); Wilkinson, Mental 
Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 38 (1944). 
4 Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
272 (1949). 
5 D. HENDERSON & 1. BATCHELOR, PSYCHIATRY Ch. 15 ·(9th ed. 1962). 
24 
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illnes may be attributed to a psychological disorder or stress. Thus, persons 
without demonstrable disease or injury of the body may be considered to be 
mentally ill. For example, a young adult who neglects his personal hygiene and 
refuses to study or earn a living may be diagnosed as "schizophrenic" or as suffer­
ing from a "functional psychosis."6 In such cases the mental illness is attributed 
to and is also the name of a malfunctioning of the personality. Finally, mental 
illnes may be used as a socially acceptable excuse or pretext for claiming non­
responsibility for socially deviant or legally prohibited conduct. For example, 
a young man accused of murdering his fiancee may claim that he was tem­
porarily insane (with jealousy, perhaps) at the time of the kilg. Yet, when 
making this claim, he may be in good bodily and mental health, both according 
to himself and the medical experts who examine him. 
These examples illustrate the difference between the theoretical and the 
practical definitions of the concept of mental illness. Theoretically, mental illness 
may be defined as "unsoundness or derangement of the mind."1 Practically, 
the concept of mental illness must be broken down into two distinct components: 
a biological or behavioral condition and a social role.8 
When we say that a person is ill (bodily or mentally), we may mean two 
things: first, that he displays an abnormal biological or behavioral condition; 
or second, that he occupies a deviant social role. For example, a person suffer­
ing from pneumonia displays symptoms of an abnormal biological condition 
(cough, fever, increased white count, clouding of the lung fields on X-ray 
examination) . Similarly, a schizophrenic person displays evidences of an 
abnormal behavioral condition (incoherent speech, neglect of personal hygiene, 
assertion of a false personal identity). These characteristics, usually identified 
by a physician, signify that the person is in an abnormal condition called 
"illness." Usually, but not always, individuals assume the sick role because they 
suffer from a condition identified by a physician as an illness. Sometimes, how­
ever, a person diagnosed by physicians as sick contends that he is not; and 
sometimes a person diagnosed by physicians as not sick, contends that he is. 
In short, there is no fixed logical or empirical connection between illness as a 
condition and illnes as a role. This is because illness as a condition is something 
that happens to a person. It is in this sense that a person "falls ill." The sick 
role, however, is usually the result of something that a person does. It is in this 
sense that we say that a person "acts ill" or decides to asume the role of patient.9 
For. example, a person suffering from pneumonia may cal his physician and 
be admitted to a hospital for treatment; he then assumes the sick role. Another 
such individual, however, may eschew medical care, and seek instead the services 
of a Christian Science practitioner, he then does not asume the' sick role. 
Similarly, a person suffering from mental illnes may seek the services of a 
psychiatrist and be admitted to a hospital for treatment; he then asumes the 
6 !d. at ch. 11. 
7 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1965). 
8 Szasz, Scientific Method and Social Role in Medicine and Psychiatry, 101 A.M.A. ARCH. 
INT. MED. 228 (1958). 
9 See I!enerally, R. PETERS, THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATION (1958); or. SZASZ, THE 
MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961); and C. RYCROFT, PSYCHOANALYSIS OBSERVED (1967). 
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role of mental patient. Frequendy, however, as in the example of the 
schizophrenic cited above, such a person behaves as if he wanted to be left alone; 
if so, he does not asume the sick role but may be cast into the role of mental 
patient against his will.'"o 
Many people believe that al diseases, including mental illness, are abnormal 
biological conditions.l:1 This narrow view ignores the concept of social role as 
part of the larger concept of sickness. Thus, the crucial question of whether 
the individual is cast into or asumes the role of mental patient is left obscure. 
This mystification is then used strategically, either by the patient to advance 
his interests or by the patient's adversaries to advance their interests.12 
The medical evidence used to support or refute the presence or absence of 
mental illness, in both civil and criminal actions, will be rational and sensible 
only to the extent that our concept of mental illness is rational and sensible. 
In nonpsychiatric medicine, disease means an abnormal biological condition of 
the body. In psychiatry, however, disease means an abnormal behavioral con­
dition of the person. Hysteria, depression and schizophrenia are considered 
mental diseases because in such conditions the conduct of the individual deviates 
from normal moral and social standards.I3 Thus, it is evident that the differences 
between these two categories of disease are far more significant than their 
similarities. 
The asessment of biological deviations is the legitimate task of physicians. 
Only medical experts have the requisite knowledge to ascertain whether an 
electrocardiographic tracing or an X-ray is normal or abnormal. However, 
according to the traditions of Anglo-American law, assessment of social standards 
of behavior is the task of the legal profession and lay juries. The nonmedical 
character of psychiatric determinations of mental illness may be illustrated by 
means of some examples. In the case of a murder trial, like that of Jack Ruby, 
some psychiatrists may testify that the defendant committed the act while he 
was insane, whereas others may testify that he committed it while sane.14 The 
experts on both sides base their judgment on observations of the accused person's 
behavior, obtained through either direct observation in the clinical interview, 
the reconstruction of behavior by means of the subject's own statements about 
past events, or the reports of other observers. Only in the rarest cases, where 
behavior is grossly impaired, is reference to stricdy medical evidence (to disease 
or injury of the brain) conclusive support for the claim that the subject is in .. 
competent. Ordinarily, such disease or injury is either nonexistent or, if present, 
interpretable as either a sufficient or an insufficient indicator of incompetence. 
10 See generally, T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963), especially chapter 12. 
11 E.g., Kallman, The Genetics of Human Behauior, 113 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1956); 
Meehl, Schizotaxia, Schizotypy, Schizophrenia, 17 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 827 (1962); 
L. KALINOWSKY & P. HOCH, SOMATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY (1961). 
12 Szasz, The Uses of Naming and the Origin of the Myth of Mental Illness, 16 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 59 (1961); Szasz, Psychoanalysis and Taxation: A Contribution to the Rhetoric 
of the Disease Concept in Psychiatry, 18 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 635 (1964). 
13 See, e.g., Reider, The Concept of Normality, 19 PSYCHOANALYT. Q. 43 (1950); 
Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113 (1960); D. OFFER & M. 
SABSHIN, NORMALITY (1966). 
14 M. BELLI, DALLAS JUSTICE 169-216 (1964); J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, THE TRIAL OF 
JACK RUBY 209-63 (1965). 
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In such cases, psychiatrists rely on what they call clinical judgment.15 It is im­
portant to keep in mind that the evidence the psychiatrist works with is behavioral, 
and thus his final judgment is an opinion about the socioethlcal normality 
of conduct. This explains how Freud could find President Wilson a seriously 
mentally sick individual/6 whereas others considered him the paragon of mental 
health. Physicians agree on the biological standards of bodily health; accordingly, 
they can agree that it is better not to have tuberculosis than to have it. Psy­
chiatrists, however, do not agree on the moral standards of mental health; 
accordingly, they cannot agree whether it is better to read the Bible eyery day 
than not to do so. 
If it is indeed true that the medical evidence underlying the assessment 
of mental illnes or insanity is grounded upon a moral and social judgment of 
personal conduct, then a significant inference for law must be drawn from 
this fact. To the extent that personal conduct is public it is visible to experts 
and laymen alike. To prove or disprove that an individual has engaged in a 
certain kind of action requires conformance to the judicial principle of due 
process. If, for example, a person is accused of having sexually exhibited himself; 
and if he denies the accusation, it is necessary for the prosecution to present 
convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty. On the other hand, if the 
accusation is couched not in the concrete terms of an offense, but in the abstract 
terms of a mental illness, a person in effect is accused of a type of misconduct 
and may be cast into the role of deviant without it having been shown that he 
had actually engaged in any socially deviant or legally prohibited act. Only 
overt acts are considered publicly visible and fit for judgment by a lay jury. The 
mythical condition called mental illness, however, is considered visible only to 
the psychiatrist (just as a smudge on an X-ray film is "visible" only to the 
radiologist), and must therefore be judged by medical experts. The public 
judgment of social conduct based on common sense (the prevailing norms of 
the community) is thus displaced by a private judgment of it based on quasi­
medical criteria (the moral sense of psychiatrists). 
It is impossible to appreciate the significance of the concept of mental 
illness without paying due attention to the social consequences of being identified 
as mentally il. The mentaly il person is held not responsible for any criminal 
act he may have committed.17 At the same time, he is treated as a member of 
a special class of inferior persons (in some ways similar to children) who cannot 
care for themselves and whose conduct may therefore be legitimately controlled 
by the state. Persons exculpated from criminal responsibility because of mental 
illness are usually confined in mental hospitals, often for longer periods than 
they would have to serve had they been convicted of the offense with which they 
were 'charged.18 Persons excused from social ineptitude because of mental illness 
lose such rights as the freedom to administer their possessions,19 to make con-
15 ' D. HENDERSON & I. BATCHELOR, supra note 5, at 419. 
16 S. F�UD & W. BULLITT, THOMAS WOODROW WILSON (1966). 
17 J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW § 36 (1934). 
18 E.g., The tragic case of Mr. Frederick Lynch in T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 226-
45 (1965); c/.,Dennison v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 933, 267 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ct. C1. 1966). 
19 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW ch. 9 (1961). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Notre Dame L.  28 1967-1968
28 NOTRE DAME LAWYER [October, 1967] 
tracts,20 to marry or divorce.21 Once so handicapped, they stand in constant 
threat of incarceration through civil commitment. 
In short, though persons deemed irresponsible are considered in need of 
special care and treatment, society allows escape from responsibility only at the 
cost of imposing serious deprivations of civil liberties.22 Thus, to be clasified 
as irresponsible is to be placed in a class of inferior persons. If such clasification 
is imposed on a person against his will, it is - regardless of the benevolent or 
therapeutic intentions of the clasifiers - very similar to overt punishment and 
ought to be treated with the same concern for individual rights that is dis­
played in crirninal law.23 
III. The Legal Implications of Mental Illness in Civil Wrongs 
Treating mental illness as a problem in personal conduct rather than as a 
medical illness has far-reaching implications for the law of torts. The simplest 
argument regarding the legal relation between civil wrongs and mental illness 
might run this way: in torts, liability is premised on fault;24 since the mentally 
ill are not in control of their acts they are not at fault and consequently, they 
should not be liable for their action. Such a superficially appealing resolution 
of this difficult problem, however, is not very convincing. Generaly the courts 
have rejected the mental illness defense to tort liability.25 Those who would have  
the law absolve the mentally ill from civil responsibility26 might, insist that the 
psychiatric and societal view of mental illness has changed substantially since 
the policy was last carefully exarnined.27 It is equally true that the concept 
of fault in tort law also has changed. In the early stages of tort law the concept 
of fault had an extremely subjective application. A person was responsible for 
the damage he caused not only because he caused it, but also because he was 
morally to blame for it.28 At present, while the fault concept is still intrinsic to 
tort liability, fault is interpreted in a more objective manner. Culpability turns 
more on a consideration of the societal judgment of the conduct in question than 
on the actor's motivation.29 
People raised in a society learn its taboos and are considered moraly blame-
20 !d. at 263-64. 
21 !d. at ch. 7. 
22 For a dramatic illustration, see the case of Ezra Pound: J. CORNELL, THE TRIAL OF 
EZRA POUND (1966); and the review of this book, Szasz, There Was No Defense, N.Y. TlDles 
Book Review, Nov. 13, 1966, at 4. 
23 See T. SZASZ, supra note 10, at 223-36. 
24 Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability, 30 HARv. L. REv. 241, 257-59 (1917). 
25 The cases are gathered in Wilkinson, supra note 3. 
26 E.g., Ague, supra note 3; Wilkinson, supra note 3. Neither author proposes absolute 
immunity but both strongly urge a partial immunity without giving a definition of its scope. 
27 Modem psychology and psychiatry have revealed some information concerning the 
nature of mental diseases and disorders, but the decisions show little use by either 
counsel or court of this modem knowledge. In the reported cases the term 'insanity' 
is used as a blanket term which covers almost anything needing a label. Some of 
the generalities pushed around in an effort to create the appearance of reason show 
but slight progress since the witch-burning days of Lord Hale. Wilkinson, supra 
note 3, at 57. 
28 Isaacs, Fault and Liability, 31 fuRV. L. REV. 954, 966 (1918). 
29 W. PROSSER. TORTS 17-18 (3d ed. 1964); VoId, The Functional Perspective for the 
Law of Torts, 14 NEB. L. REv. 217 (1936). 
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worthy should they violate -them. There are some cases, however, that test the 
diference between subjective fault and its objectified counterpart. Garratt v. 
Daileyso is such a case. In Garratt an infant pulled a chair out from under an 
arthritic woman who was seriously injured in the resulting fall. The woman 
sued the boy using the tort theory of battery which requires proof of the intention 
to commit the act in question. The trial court posed the issue of the intention 
to injure subjectively, finding that the defendant 
did not have any wilful or unlawful purpose [in pulling the chair out] . • .  
he did not have any intent to injure the plaintiff� or any intent to bring 
about any unauthorized or offensive contact with her person . • .  [and] 
did not have purpose� intent or design to perform a prank or to effect an 
assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff.s1 
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Washington thought the test had 
been improperly chosen. The court observed that: 
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff's fall, it was 
proved that, when Brian moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty 
that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been .... 
The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to playa prank on 
her or to embars her, or to commit an assault or battery on her would 
not absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. . . • 
Without such knowledge, there would be nothing wrongful about Brian's 
act in moving the chair and, there being no wrongful act, there would be 
no liability.82 
The relevant question, then, is whether the defendant intended to commit 
an act, understanding its probable consequences. Beyond those intentions the 
court wil not inquire. The choice of theory here determined the outcome. On 
remand, the plaintif recovered $11,000.33 
In evaluating the moral posture of an actor, it is customary to examine 
motivation. Ethically, a well-intentioned person may be held blameless even 
though he has caused serious harm. In tort law, however, good intentions 
frequently are not exculpating. Thus, a person guilty of an intentional mis­
statement may be held for deceit even though his lie was intended to help rather 
than harm.34 The converse, however, is not true. Courts often punish a person 
for harm caused maliciously under circumstances in which the same act done 
in good faith would not be actionable. A public official may be criticized for 
his official conduct even though the critic acting in good faith may be mistaken 
about his facts,35 but a similar criticism made with knowledge of its falsity 
and in an effort to harm him is actionable.3s A person may open up a com­
petitive busines with the intention of taking the customers of competitors. If 
30 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955). 
31 !d. at 199, 279 P.2d at 1092. 
32 !d. at 202, 279 P.2d at 1094. 
-33 Garratt v. Dailey, 49 Wash. 2d 499, 3M P.2d 681 (1956). 
34 W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 715. 
35 New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
36 !d. at 279-80. 
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his only aim is profit, he escapes civil punishment, 31 but if it is to drive out a 
personal enemy, his conduct is actionable.3s Indeed, the malicious intention of 
harming another by the use of unprivileged, though lawful, conduct may itself 
establish prima facie liability of the actor.39 
While it is interesting to note the extent to which the law still takes into 
account maliciousnes of motive in cases which otherwise would not be action­
able, for present purposes it is more important to emphasize that the law has 
become increasingly unreceptive to the use of good intentions as an excuse. 
Another pertinent doctrine, with a somewhat analogous effect, is that of trans .. 
ferred intent. This doctrine 'holds a person liable for injury to an unintended 
victim.40 The necesary malevolence directed at the intended victim is trans­
ferred to the person actually injured, thus placing a claim in the hands of an 
individual whose injury was, from the standpoint of the perpetrator, wholly 
accidental. Similarly, a mistaken belief in one's right to commit an act, although 
honestly formed, is no defense to a tort action premised on the injury caused 
unless a countervailing reason makes the conduct privileged. For example, if a. 
person intederes with the property of another by removing it or causing its 
destruction, he cannot defend an action seeking its value by showing that he 
reasonably believed it to be his own. His mistake about ownership, while morally 
significant, is legally irrelevant.41. A person who trespasses on land in the honest 
but mistaken belief that it is his own or that he has the consent of an owner, 
is nevertheless held liable for the damage he caused.42 
There are some mistakes, however, that the law will recognize as exculpating. 
Some of these are: an honest but misguided fear for personal safety, resulting 
in self-defense;43 a mistaken but honest and reasonable belief by a peace office!: 
that he had valid grounds to arrest for a serious crime;44 and the reasonable 
detention by a storekeeper of a person whom he reasonably believes to have 
stolen from him.45 What distinguishes the exculpatory mistakes from those 
37 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (dictum). 
38 !d. 
39 W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 26. 
40 Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637, 301 P.2d 440 (1956). 
41 Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139 P. 815 (1914). 
42 Southern Counties Ice Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Cal. 
1941); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (1965). Comment a. to the section is par­
ticularly instructive. In order to be held liable for trespass on land 
it is necessary only that the actor intentionally be upon any part of the land in 
question. It is not necessary that he intend to invade the possessor's interest in the 
exclusive possession of his land and, therefore, that he knows his entry to be an 
intrusion. If the actor is and intends to be upon the particular piece of land in 
question, it is immaterial that he honestly and reasonably believes that he has the 
consent of the lawful possessor to entry, or, indeed, that he himself is its possessor. 
Unless the actor's mistake was induced by the conduct of the possessor, it is imma­
terial that the mistake is one such as a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances 
which the actor knows or could have discovered by the most careful investigations 
would have made. One who enters any piece of land takes the risk of the existence 
of such facts as would give him a right or privilege to enter. So too, the actor 
cannot escape liability by showing that his mistaken belief in the validity of his 
title is due to the advice of the most eminent of counsel. Indeed, even though a 
statute expressly confers title upon him, he takes the risk that the statute may 
thereafter be declared unconstitutional. 
43 Paxton v. Boyer, 67 III. 132 (1873). 
44 Schneider v. Kessler, 97 F.2d 542, 544 (3d Cir. 1938). 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965). 
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that are not is a countervailing policy reason for immunity. For example, the 
injury inflicted in misconceived self-defense is as likely to leave a victim in need 
of compensation as damage caused in a mistaken belief as to ownership of 
property. Indeed, the damage is likely to be personal injury rather than property 
loss and thus should command greater concern. As against this, there are com­
pelling reasons to allow a person self-help when he is under attack from which he 
cannot safely withdraw. In applying this customary rationale for privilege, it is 
concluded that one must allow reasonable mistakes for fear of otherwise. 
impinging on a conceded right.46 In any event, the law is thought to be in­
capable of effectively preventing self-defense in such situations, because it comes 
too naturally to' the actor.41 In the other cases mentioned, the policy reason is 
more apparent and less controversial. A police officer is performing an important 
societal function when he exercises his power of arrest. Under many circum­
stances he canot be expected to know enough to make the final determination 
concerning the validity of the grounds on which he is proceeding. While one 
may wonder whether the threat of civil liability would actually diSsuade many 
policemen from the performance of what they conceive to be their duty, at 
least there is a satisfactory reason for concluding that the risk of harm to in­
nocent persons at the hands of honestly motivated policemen ought to be borne 
by some groups other than the policemen. For the storekeeper, the need to 
detain a person reasonably believed to be a shoplifter is equally important. As 
retail merchandising turns more and more to self-service, the danger of shop­
lifting becomes more acute and the need of a short time for investigation before 
the customer's departure may be critical. The present rule appears to strike the 
proper balance between the customer's interest in free movement and the shop­
keeper's need for protection. To ensure that it is not too favorable to the shop­
keeper, the law requires him to have reasonable grounds for believing that a 
theft has taken place.48 
A privilege, similar to that given a police officer, is afforded to private 
citizens in accomplishing similar functions. Thus, it is generally agreed that a 
private citizen is privileged in arresting a person who has actually committed 
a felony or a felony having been committed, a person reasonably believed to 
have committed it.49 Similar privileges attend arrest in cases of attempted 
felony or leser offenses committed in the presence of the arresting citizen.5o 
Againy one can see the fashioning of the rule in terms of a close balancing of 
societal interests. 
However, one privilege in which it is difficult to find the balancing of 
46 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 3.11 ( 1956). 
47 See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 1 1 0. There ·is every reason to retreat from such 
arguments. In the first place, they contradict each other. If one is not to be dissuaded from 
such actions by legal sanctions, then the other reason for including mistaken actions with 
well-founded ones ceases. Secondly, there is a better-reasoned doctrine in the law which 
provides that when necessity causes an actor to invade another's interests, his invasion is 
privileged in the sense that he may not be prevented from committing his act, Ploof v. Putnam, 
81 Vt. 47 1, 7 1  A. 188 ( 1908), but he i s  not excused from compensation for the damage he 
has done, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 ( 1910). 
48 Collyer v. S. H. Kress Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 5 4  P.2d 20 ( 1936). 
49 United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829, 831 (2d Cir. 1944); W. PROSSER, supra 
note 29, at 135. . 
50 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 46, § 3.18, at 281-82. 
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societal interests is that attendant on the apprehension of mentally il persons. 
The Restatement of Torts takes the view that a person is privileged to apprehend 
a person who is mentally incompetent if he suspects that such person is about 
to commit an act likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to himself or to 
others.51 While a mistake as to the likelihood of harm is excused if reasonable, 
a mistake as to the person's mental competency is not. One is left to wonder 
about the extent to which public policy is asserted in this particular privilege. 
If there is a public policy favoring the apprehension of mentally incompetent 
persons, such as protecting the interests of society or the interests of the person 
apprehended, it ought to lead to a privilege broad enough to encompass reason­
able mistakes about a person's mental competency. Indeed, requiring a private 
citizen to predict the likely outcome in litigation of the question of a person's 
mental competency places a burden on him that in legal theory he is incapable 
of meeting, since mental competency is an issue on which psychiatric expert 
testimony is usually required. On the other hand, if one is hesitant to allow 
apprehension of mental incompetents unless the force used could be justified 
either on the grounds of civil arrest or self-defense, then it is questionable why 
any additional privilege is, in fact, granted. 
In connection with exculpatory mistakes, it is necessary to consider the 
rather artificial distinction drawn at law between mistakes of fact and mistakes 
of law. While it may be difficult clearly to distinguish mistakes of law from 
those of fact, the general rule is that one is not excused for a mistake of law, 
even under circumstances that would excuse one if he relied on a mistake of 
fact.52 Prosser points out that the two major rationales for the distinction leave 
something to be desired.53 The theory applied to a mistake of law, broadly 
stated, is that everyone is presumed to know the law and thus to be incapable 
of being misled by a misstatement of it. Furthermore, the law is thought to be 
so esoteric that no one would reasonably rely on another's account of what the 
law provides (unless the asserter were a lawyer) and thus would not make 
mistakes based on hearsay. Actually, as is true of the other mistakes mentioned, 
the basic decision can be understood only in terms of policy. To the extent that 
the law is sound in its distinction, it is so because of results that would follow 
from allowing parties to deny knowledge of the applicable provisions of govern­
ing law. In criminal law, at least, the state might understandably be loath to' 
establish knowledge of the law in each case in which a prosecution was based 
on violation. It is doubtful, however, that a similarly important reason exists 
for the rule in civil cases since these cases usually involve an active asertion 
concerning law for which the actor is responsible and which he seeks to nullify. 
What emerges from this discussion is the conclusion that, in mistake cases, 
the law is balanced rather carefully not only on the matter of whether there 
is likely to be moral fault by the defendant, but also on the question of whether 
the legal proces can withstand the added concern for proof. For at least some 
forms of mistake, the further conclusion is that the fault question must be handled 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120c (1965). 
52 ct. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 740. 
53 !d. at 740-41. 
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more objectively with an accommodation being made to trial realities or to policy 
reasons favoring one course of action over another. 
Having explored the vagaries of the legal effect of mistake, one can 
understand why courts _ might be as reluctant to allow immunity for harm to 
others caused by mental illness  as for harm caused by misinformation as to the 
title to land. Not only are the policy reasons that create exceptions to the 
objectivity of the mistake doctrine hard to find in these cases, but any excep­
tion would also immediately involve courts in proof problems of extreme dif­
culty. Thus, some commentators conclude that the mistake doctrine ought to 
be applied by analogy to the insanity cases, and the insane held responsible 
for their acts.54 
It is our contention that this analogy is a too simplistic view of the legal 
responsibility of the mentally ill. It continues the law's general predisposition to 
consider insanity as an illness and to attribute the mistaken beliefs to disease. 
For the clas of persons here discussed, the reasoning is curiously circular. While 
suffering from no known or relevant biological malfunction, a person is declared 
to be ill because of the mistakes he makes in interpreting reality and reacting to 
it. His illnes consists of the likelihood of continually making similar mistakes. 
The greater the probability of his doing so, the more serious is the illness. To 
formulate a rule exculpating the insane would then come close to saying that 
mistakes must be disregarded if made in small numbers, but must be honored 
as defenses as they increase quantitatively and in scope. Indeed, as previously 
pointed out, 55 the relevant evidence is likely to concern itself with precisely the 
kind of conduct that clasc tort law deliberately disregards. As also noted 
above,56 in tort law it is usually irrelevant that an actor intended no harm, or 
perhaps even intended benefit, to his victim. That being true, it seems incon­
sistent to structure a rule which would exculpate because the actor has les 
capacity to resist inflicting harm than a more inhibited person. 
In an article illuminating the liability of the insane, 57 Profesor Bohlen 
grouped such persons with infants, and then, erroneously we think, equated 
the liability of the two groups. A review of the diferences between the liability 
of insane persons and infants demonstrates the price paid for legal irresponsibility. 
As a general rule children can be said to be liable for their torts to the 
same extent as adults or, for that matter, insane persons;58 but a child is excused 
if he does not comprehend the probable consequences of his act. Thus in 
Garratt v. Dailey/9 as discussed above, the infant would quite properly have 
been exculpated had he been incapable of understanding that the removal of 
the chair would result in the plaintif faling to the ground. There is a strong 
commitment to exculpation in this type of situation. T4e child must be capable 
of understanding the specific consequences of his act, and his general capacity 
must be specifically evaluated even though a case-by-case e�amination has in 
54 See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 1029. 
55 Notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text. 
56 Notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text. 
57 Bohlen, supra note 3, at 31-34. 
58 !d. at 9-10; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 46, at 657. 
59 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955). 
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most other areas been read out of tort law in favor of an objective standard. 
Although generic rules may guide courts as to children's capacity, in the final 
analysis the question remains what is the mental capacity of the specific child 
in question.GO Clearly, the child's role in tort law is a protected one. He is 
exculpated for conduct believed to be beyond his comprehension. At the same 
time, and as part of the same protection, he is denied the privilege freely td 
engage in the business of the adult world. Not only is he denied the right to 
contract in a way binding on himself61 and thus in a way acceptable to others, 
but he is also the object of other protective legislation: child labor laws,62 laws 
relating to the morality of minors,63 prohibitions against consumption of alcoholic 
beverages,64 against marriage 65 and voting.66 In addition, children are the 
subjects of parental discipline and of schoolmarm censure.67 Where the parental 
guidance fails, the law does not pass the rights of decision-making to the child, 
but rather looks for a substitute decision-maker. Furthermore, court approval 
is sometimes required for transactions concerning a minor.68 The guardianship 
of natural parents may be temporarily divested so that a court may order emer­
gency care, such as a blood transfusion for a child despite the parents' religious 
scruples,69 or the court may attend to some other emergency that it concludes 
is inadequately attended to by the parents.70 In some cases the present cus­
todian of the child may be divested of his mandate and a new custodian chosen.71 
The decision-maker in custody cases is the state, usually operating through a 
court, and its decision can be made without consulting the child and, if neces­
sary, in the face of the decision that the child would prefer to make.72 
Paternalistic supervision of the activities of the child and decision-making 
for the child differ significantly from comparable activity on behalf of the 
insane. However demeaning the role of child may be perceived to be by the 
child, at least it is a socially acceptable one. The same cannot be said of insanity. 
Furthermore, childhood is a status that one can, by the mere passage of time, 
count on outgrowing. Again, the same cannot be said of the status of insanity. 
Lastly, the matter of children's rights is under periodic review, and societal 
responsibility is often shared with persons still under the age of contract. For 
60 Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 A. 457 (1931). 
61 Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N.E. 53 (1919). 
62 E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1067 (1938) as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 
212 (1964). 
63 E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 70; 483; 483a; 483b; 484; 485-4,5; 486-2,3; 494. 
64 E.g., N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 65. 
65 E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15-a. 
66 E.g., N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 150. 
67 State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 348 (1837); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 46, 
at 290-91. 
68 E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 3-105. 
69 E.g., Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. Ct. and Dom. ReI. 
Ct. 1961); c/. Santos v. Goldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450 '(1962) ("neglect" 
found in parents' failure to allow transfusion). 
70 See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act, Art. 3 (1963) (neglect proceedings) and especially § 356 
(Order of protection) allowing court to mandate proper treatment for child. 
71 E.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act, Art. 6, pt. 1 §§ 611-26 (1963). 
72 See Commonwealth v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 146 A.2d 362 (1958) (mother ordered 
to send child to father for visitation despite child's protest and prior physical abuse of child). 
,- ,  '"0  
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example, a minor may drive,T3 marry,74 in New York drink,T5 consent to inter­
course,76 and fight in the armed forces.77 An insane person, however, cannot 
count on any of these rights. 
The comparison of the legal position of the insane with that of the child 
illuminates what is, in many ways, obvious: that to deny a person the legal 
capacity to form intentional acts for which he is held responsible is to diminish, 
or even deny, his status as a full-fledged human being. Such a person can neither 
be blamed, nor credited, for his actions. This may be illustrated by the appli­
cation of this principle to the defamation area. In defamation, the principal 
aim of a lawsuit is not compensation for the victim; instead, it is a vehicle for 
restoring his reputation. The jury awards money to the plaintif in an amount 
sufficient to clear his name publicly. The amount awarded is symbolic rather 
than real, since reputation cannot actually be purchased with money. If the 
plaintif wins his suit, his legal victory also establishes the correctness of his 
claim. If, on the other hand, the defendant wins or the plaintif recovers merely 
a nominal sum, then the defendant is victorious for the defamation carries the 
imprimatur of the jury.78 How nice it would be for a truthfully defamed person 
if he lost his suit not on the ground of defendant's proof of truth but on the 
ground that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to be responsible for his 
act. To the extent that he could maneuver such a mock battle, he could come 
close to rebuilding his falsely favorable reputation with the asistance of the 
court. Thus, we believe that on the balance the present law of toI;ts disregarding 
the mental condition of the actor19 is appropriate. 
IV. The Ramifications of Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs 
Perhaps the most obvious change that would be brought about by a policy 
broadening the scope of civil irresponsibility would be unjustifiably to deprive 
victims of compensation. To refuse the injured compensation is never a pleasant 
decision, but it is one made throughout the law of torts and thus at least a 
familiar one. It can be defended, to some extent, by pointing to the societal 
cost of shif�g funds from one innocent person to another,80 but this argument 
does not justify depriving deserving victims of fair compensation. We favor; 
therefore, the retention of the present rule because of our belief that acts ascribed 
to insanity are not blameless in the way in which indiferent accidents are.81 
A reason often mentioned in some of the older cases that compensation 
should be awarded to the victim since this wil encourage guardians of incom­
petents to exercise more control over their charges82 must be repudiated. If the 
73 E.g., N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 501-h. 
74 E.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 25. 
75 N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 65. 
76 E.g., People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y.S. 524 (1911) (dictum). See N.Y. 
PEN. LAW § 2010. 
77 Selective Service Act of 1967, S. 1432, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). 
78 See C. MORRIS, TORTS, 284-86 (1953). 
79 W. PROSSER, TORTS, 1029-30 (3d ed. 1964). 
80 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 46, at 754-55; C. MORRIS, supra note 78, at 
10, 209. 
81 See T. SZASZ, MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 142-43 (1961). 
82 W. PROSSER, supra note 79, at 1029. . 
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conduct of guardians is to be controlled, then that should be done on the basis 
of their negligent conduct rather than in a derivative fashion by casting liability 
on the insane. 
It is also significant that a person dealing with another who might raise 
the defense of insanity is bound to be affected by the decision made concerning 
liability for injury. Adults justifiably avoid dealing legally with children because 
of a recognition of their immunity to suit. Likewise, mentally healthy persons 
may be expected to avoid dealing with mentally sick ones - indeed, with any­
one who might be so classified for various reasons (i.e., previous contact with 
psychiatrists, poverty, political or religious deviance) - if the mentally sick are 
held harmless when they injure. Such a policy would thus create a class of 
irresponsible persons, similar to the class of mental patients. However, persons 
in this hypothetical class might well be shut off from society and desocialized 
to an extent surpassing anything with which we are familiar today. 
One of the classic tort cases concerning an insane person is McGuire v; 
Almy.83 The plaintiff was a nurse injured through assault by her patient. It 
would seem that should the patient be exculpated for such an act, there might 
be a greater reluctance to be a caretaker. Unlike the ever-present parent or 
guardian in the child's case, a person who is mentally ill may or may not have 
a guardian. While a process exists for establishing a guardian to supervise a 
number of actions of an adjudicated incompetent,84 many persons who might 
on trial be found to be insane have no such guardians. Refusal to compensate 
the victims of tortious acts committed by insane persons would surely leave the 
insane persons more dehumanized and friendless than they are at present. 
No les important than the question of compensating the victim is the 
question of finding the source of the money that will be used to compensate. 
In this day of broad coverage for general liability in family insurance policies, 
it is probable that in a large percentage of cases, the ultimate recourse might 
be to an insurer. Disregarding the difficult question of whether an insurer is 
bound by these policies to compensate for intentional acts85 as well as the addi­
tional complication of whether an act committed by an insane person is inten­
tional for insurance pUrposes,86 it seems legitimate to identify insurance com­
panies as very much parties in the resolution of the question being considered. 
Where an insurance company is not involved, the money taken from a person 
mentally ill enough to be exculpated in tort might well be money that could be 
managed on the tortfeasor's behalf by a guardian appointed for him because 
of his mental illness. Finally, any money tal�en from the tortfeasor may ulti­
mately deprive his immediate family and the other potential beneficiaries of his 
estate. Any member of these groups may be motivated to seek appointment of 
a guardian. With others so vitally interested in preserving the insane person's 
assets the result of a rule exculpating the mentally ill is obvious. These people 
would be strongly motivated to assure that the defense of mental illness was 
83 297 Mass. 323, 8 N.E.2d 760 (1937). 
84 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 223-24, 239-
45 (1961). 
85 See lA J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw §§ 481-92 (1941). 
86 !d. § 482. 
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raised whenever it was arguably applicable in tort cases. Unlike other defenses 
that presumably are raised or abandoned at the discretion of the litigant,. the 
defense of mental iles is one which, by its very nature, may be logicaly 
iniposed on him. After al, if a person is mentaly il enough to be exculpated, 
can he be sane enough to determine trial strategy? 
V. Conclusion 
Only recently in criminal law did the courts escape from this logical trap 
of arguing that one who is mentally il cannot defend himself. This �pe was 
not gained by confronting and meeting the fundamental problems posed by t4e 
criminal responsibility of the insane, but was secured instead by recourse to 
what can be only a temporary expedient, namely, civil commitment. 'Before 
the important decision of Lynch v. Overholser� 87 it was possible for the prose­
cutor to avoid the rigors . of his prosecutorial duty by casting the defendant in 
the role of the insane and, as it were, proving the defense of insanity for him. 
Although he cannot do this any longer,SS the prosecutor is stil free to sidestep 
his task of proving the accused guilty of a specific offense and, instead, to seek 
his removal from society through civil commitment.S9 
It is evident that impediments to forcing a defense of insanity on a defen­
dant in a civil action could be swept away more easily than could a comparable 
defense in a criminal case.90 The hasty appointment of a guardian to manage 
87 369 U.S. 705 (1962) . 
. .  , 
88 At least under a statute of the sort in effect in the District of Columbia which mandates 
confinement of persons acquitted by reason of insanity in mental institutions. D.C. CODE § "24-
301 (I967) .  
89 The Supreme Court asserted that "Congress' basic concern • . •  of reasuring the ,public" 
concerning persons of unsound mind was provided for by civil commitment. 369 U.S. at 718. 
90 Much of the concern for civil liberties of persons accused of crime applies only to the 
criminal process. Other forms of punishment are treated as less subject to protection. Lynch v. 
Overholzer, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) (comparing civil commitment standard to criminal stan­
dard) . But see, In re Gault, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). 
Civil commitment provides the most dramatic illustration of the manner in which persons 
accused of mental imbalance rather than crime are treated legally. According to Mihm, "No 
one questions the power of the state to commit to institutions mentally unbalanced persons 
who become dangerous to the peace and safety of the community." Mihm, A Reexamination 
of the Validity of Our Sex Psychopath Statutes in the Light of Recent Appeal Cases and 
Experience, 44 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 716, 718 (1954) . If Mihm means that no one 
questions that right under present noncriminal procedures, he is wrong. We question it. 
Mihm explains, "One of the purposes of these statutes [for civil commitment] is to escape 
the rigidity of criminal proceedings. The objectives of the act are remedial, therapeutic and 
preventive . • • .  It seeks to cure and prevent rather than punish. The protection of society as 
well as the benefit of the individual are the main objectives, all of which spells ,out a civil 
rather than a criminal proceeding." Id. at 719. 
It should not be overlooked that the criminal process for identification of persons who 
threaten the state is not inconsistent with the theory of "benefit" to the person involved. A 
convict need not serve his time in jail; mental hospital confinement is an alternative. (The 
District of Columbia provisions are discussed in Lynch v. Overholzer. "369 U.S. 705, 718 
(1962) . )  At least that sort of sentencing is  finite. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. '107 
(1966) (state may not provide for automatic retention beyond sentence) .  Whether 1t is more 
desirable than incarceration in prison depends on one's view of the institutions involved and is 
far removed from the thesis of this paper. That one could responsibly report that there was 
no opposition to a process for selecting persons to be confined on a basis less restrictive than 
criminal due process illuminates how ephemeral the rights of persons accused of mental im­
balance are. Can one doubt that, in the context of tort litigation, they would be treated .even 
more cavalierly? 
. 
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the affairs of an alleged incompetent provides all the legal authority needed in 
such cases to take over the decision-making function.91 This raises the specter 
of an avaricious family rushing to court to prove one of its members mentaly 
ill in order to preserve the family fortune. We might also witness cases in which 
insurance companies, fearful of the outcome of litigation, would introduce the 
issue of the defendant's mental illness against the wishes of the insured. 
In criminal cases, as well as in civil cases, the issue of mental iIlness avoids 
the question of substance that would otherwise be litigated. Thus it is possible 
that others seeking a favorable judgment will force a defendant to win with an 
insanity plea when it would be more expensive or more complicated to litigate 
the substantive underlying issue. An assault victim might find himself cast as 
insane to avoid the vagaries of jury determination as to who was the aggressor. 
An alleged defamer might well find his words made meaningless by a deter­
mination of his insanity when he could have proven truth. 
Unfortunately, the logic does not stop there. It commands one additional 
step. If a person deemed civilly irresponsible is at large, surely he cannot bei 
allowed to continue to commit torts without compensating his victims. A person 
enjoying the liberties of a sane citizen, but licensed at law to commit tortious acts 
with impunity, is unthinkable. The pressure to restrain by incarceration in a 
mental hospital would seem irresistible, both logically and practically. That it is 
irresistible in fact is demonstrated by the history of the mental iIInes defense, 
especially in the District of Columbia. The Durham Rule,92 conceived as human­
izing reform, has been open to criticism on precisely this ground. Persons 
exculpated of criminal offenses because of insanity have drawn longer "sen­
tences" in mental institutions than they would have received in prison had they 
been convicted of crime.93 Some, no doubt, could not or would not have been 
convicted. A similar fate for persons accused of civil acts that cause harm would 
seem extremely unfortunate. So unfortunate, indeed, that this outcome is perhaps 
the main deterrent to extending the "logic" of mental irresponsibility from the 
sphere of crimes to that of torts. 
9 1  Decision making is customarily taken over in a pervasive manner. A good illustration is 
provided by J. CORNELL, THE TRIAL OF EZRA POUND ( 1966 ) .  See Szasz, There War No De­
fense, N.Y. Times Bok Review, Nov. 13, 1966, at 4. 
: 92 Durham v. United States, 2 14 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954 ) .  
9 3  See note 1 8  supra. 
